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The Approaching Death of the Collective Right
Theory of the Second Amendment
Roger L Roots*
INTRODUCTION
The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."' To most Americans,
this language guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms,
2
in accordance with what is generally accepted as the plain
language of the Amendment. 3 However, a rival interpretation of this
language - the "collective right" theory of the Second
Amendment,4 - has gained numerous converts in the federal
judiciary' and the organized legal profession. 6 The collective right,
* The author, Roger Isaac Roots, J.D., graduated from Roger Williams University School
of Law in 1999 and Montana State University-Billings (B.S., Sociology) in 1995. He is the
founder of the Prison Crisis Project, a not-for-profit prison and criminal justice law and
policy think tank based in Providence, Rhode Island. He owes a debt of gratitude to Duane
Horton of Portsmouth, Rhode Island, for his thoughtful and laborious proofreading efforts.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Strong Case for Gun Control, THE AMERICAN PROSPEcT,
Summer 1992, at 27 (saying that more than three-quarters of the public believes that the
Constitution guarantees an individual right to own weapons); Thomas B. McAffee & Michael
J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or
Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L REv. 781, 784 (1997) (citing polling data suggesting
that between 53% and 88% of the population believe that the Second Amendment guarantees
an individual right to bear arms).
3. See Frank Espohl, The Right to Carry Concealed Weapons for Self-Defense, 22 S. ILL
U. LJ. 151, 152-53 (1997) (citing a grammatical study establishing the Second Amendment as
an individual right). "The language of the Second Amendment can only reasonably be
interpreted as guaranteeing an individual right." Id. at 152.
4. This paper uses the term "collective right theory" to designate various general views
that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an American citizen a personal right to
possess firearms of his own acquisition or purchase. Terms such as "militia-centric," "states'
right," and "narrow individual right" have also been employed by commentators to describe
variations on the theme that the Amendment's right to bear arms is limited to possession of
arms solely in the government's service. For a discussion of the appropriateness of such
terms, see Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY U. 1139, 1204-07 (1996) (stating "we might well have called [the
collective right theory] the 'makeweight' view" for its lack of "any specific affirmative
function or substantive content.").
5. See Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAvis L
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"states' right," or "militia-centric" theory holds (apparently) 7 that
the Second Amendment merely grants the states the right to form
militias.
8
Adherents of the collective right theory tend to overlook several
glaring problems with the theory, among which are an
overwhelming constitutional history refuting the theory and the
virtual impossibility of the theory's exact implementation. The
theory's adherents tend to utilize the theory as a procedural rather
than as a substantive defense against claims of the right to possess
or own firearms. They use the collective right theory to justify
increasingly stringent gun control legislation enacted by the United
States Congress. Since the 1960's such use of the collective right
theory to quell assertions of the right of individual arms ownership
has been overwhelmingly successful. Hundreds of thousands of
Americans have been incarcerated for nonviolent, victinless gun
charges and more than 20,000 gun control laws have been enacted
nationwide without serious judicial impediment.9
All of this is about to change. A torrential backlash of
scholarship undermining the collective right theory of the Second
Amendment now makes scholarly support for the collective right
REV. 309, 316 (1997) (opining that the courts have "unanimously adopted what is generally
referred to as the 'collective rights' theory.").
6. The number of attorneys who subscribe to the collective theory is difficult to
determine. It can safely be said, however, that the collective right theory finds more support
among the organized bar than among the general public. This can be divined from the fact
that the nation's largest association of attorneys, the American Bar Association (ABA),
subscribes to the collective right view. See Brannon P Denning, Professional Discourse, the
Second Amendment and the "Talking Head Constitutionalism" Counterrevolution: A Review
Essay, 21 S. ILL U. LJ. 227, 239-40 (1997).
7. As this article establishes, the parenthetical is necessary because proponents of the
collective right theory either have not produced a fully developed explanation of its
application or have provided ambiguous or conflicting arguments so epithelial that it is
difficult to tell whether their vision of the Second Amendment grants it any real meaning at
all. See Brannon P Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an "Underenforced
Constitutional Norm," 21 H.Av. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 719, 729 (1998) (suggesting that to cast the
collective model as a "theory" at all is misleading because "its main proponents neither take
it seriously nor carefully follow its logic to a reasonable conclusion").
8. Because of the inherently vague nature of the collective right theory, this article
lumps many arguments together under that designation. For purposes of this article, the
collective right theory is defined as any argument that the Second Amendment offers no
personal right of firearm ownership or possession without the sanction of the state.
9. A 1995 report by the Justice Department revealed that more than 260,000 arrests
were made in 1993 in which a weapons offense was the most serious charge. See Lawrence
Greenfeld & Marianne W Zawitz, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Weapons Offenses and Offenders, Nov. 1995, NCJ-155284. Because weapons offenses amount
to a large percentage of all arrests, it can easily be estimated that far more than one million
people have been arrested on gun charges in the past twenty years. Id.
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theory increasingly difficult to justify.10 Collective right proponents,
once confident in their bald-faced and conclusory renunciations of
the individual right to bear arms, are now forced to couch their
support for the collective right theory in increasingly narrow terms.
To make matters even more unsettling for the theory's proponents,
recent federal court proceedings suggest the theory will soon be
subjected to embarrassing scrutiny in the courts."
This article predicts that the collective right theory of the Second
Amendment will not survive. It examines the collective right theory
and the brief history of its rise to relative prominence in legal
thought and policy. Next, this article delves into claims made by
collective right proponents in the academy and exposes them as
untenable. Finally, it concludes that the theory is unrealistic,
ideologically driven, and too poorly explained by its own adherents
to justify its continued existence in American jurisprudence.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT THEORY
The collective right theory of the Second Amendment assumes
that the opening phrase of the Amendment, which lays out the
express reason for the right to bear arms, acts as a limitation on
the right. 2 Thus, "a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State" is presented as the primary focus of the
"right" of "the people" - as a collective body only - to keep and
bear arms. Collective right theorists attempt to argue that this
language simply secures to the "free State" its "necessary" and
"well regulated Militia." Conveniently enough for gun control
advocates, "the people" of the Second Amendment are an
amorphous mass, no member of which may ever invoke the right.'3
The theory is grounded in a highly questionable construction of
the Amendment's sentence structure. It proffers that the reason for
the right is the right itself, while what a plain reading indicates is
the right is merely a poorly worded repetition of the prior clause.
Contrary to statements made by collective right proponents alleging
that such bifurcated clauses are unusual, 14 it was not at all rare for
10. See infra notes 59-60 and their accompanying text (discussing the increasingly
philosophical, rather than textual or historical, support for the collective right theory among
academics).
11. See infra notes 40-44 and their accompanying text.
12. See Bogus, supra note 2, at 27.
13. See Denning, supra note 7, at 730 (describing the collective right perception of "the
people" as an "undifferentiated mass").
14. See, e.g., Louis A. Craco, Jr., A Right to Bear Arms?, EXPERIENCE, Summer 1997, at
6, 8-9 (opining that the Second Amendment, in "sharp contrast" to other constitutional
2000
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Founding era laws to be prefaced by such clauses, and such
justification phrases were considered at the time to have no
bearing on the right or operative provision. 5 As an "interpretation,"
the collective right theory violates virtually every rule of
constitutional and statutory construction.
6
provisions, contains a "unique" explanatory clause).
15. Some commentators view the Second Amendment's wording as unusual because it
has both a justification clause ("a well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a
free State") and an operative clause ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall
not be infringed."). However, U.C.L.A. law professor Eugene Volokh has recently pointed out
that this linguistic structure was actually quite commonplace in American constitutions of
the Framers' era. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L REV.
793, 793-821 (1998). For example, Rhode Island's 1842 Constitution provides that "[t]he
liberty of the press being essential to the security of freedom in a state, any person may
publish his sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty"; the
1784 New Hampshire Constitution says that "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the trial of facts in
the vicinity where they happen, is so essential to the security of the life, liberty and estate of
the citizen, that no crime or offence ought to be tried in any other county than that in which
it is committed . . . ."; the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, the 1784 New Hampshire
Constitution, and the 1786 Vermont Constitution, with only minor differences in word choice,
all provide that "[tlhe freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the
legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any
accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." Id.
at 794-95 (citations omitted). Volokh lists dozens more such examples in the appendix of his
article. Id. at 814-21.
Professor Volokh calls the opening clause of the Second Amendment its "justification
clause" rather than a "purpose clause," id. at 795 n.8, because the only thing indicated by it
is its drafters' justification for the right to bear arms, and not any notion that the right is
contingent on the purpose of ensuring a well-regulated militia, as some authorities have
postulated, see id. at 793-94 n.1. In the linguistic styling of the times, the Second
Amendment's use of dual clauses was nothing unusual, and was, in fact, "commonplace,"
according to Professor Volokh. "My modest discovery is that the Second Amendment belongs
to a large family of similarly structured constitutional provisions: They command a certain
thing while at the same time explaining their reasons." Id. at 813.
16. Constitutional scholars disagree over whether constitutional interpretation is a
science or merely an art. The basic principles of constitutional interpretation, however, are
for the most part settled. In 1833, Justice Story in his famous Commentaries attempted to
ascertain the "true rules of interpretation applicable to the constitution" and found that "[tihe
first and fundamental rule" is to construe constitutional wording according to "the sense of
the terms, and the intention of the parties." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 134, 135 (1833). Only if the words are dubious, must their meaning be
established by context (i.e., "by comparing them with other words and sentences in the same
instrument") or the causes which led to the provision. Id. at 135. Precedent or case law may
be consulted only if the prior standards yield no definitive answer. These principles of
construction have enjoyed such longevity in the life of the Supreme Court that a century and
a half later they were again enunciated by the Court in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
905 (1997), in which the Court concluded that only where there is "no constitutional text" to
guide an interpreter should a court resort to "[1] historical understanding and practice, [2] in
the structure of the Constitution, and [3] in the jurisprudence of this Court... in that order."
That the plain text of the Second Amendment is for the most part unambiguous can be
divined from the fact that public opinion polls establish an overwhelming view among the
Death of the Collective Right Theory
The collective rights theory is a relative newcomer to
constitutional jurisprudence. It arose solely during the twentieth
century and grew popular among jurists, social commentators, and
some members of the organized American bar only during the
second half of the twentieth century.17 That the theory ever
breathed life at all is owed primarily to an irresolute 1939 United
States Supreme Court opinion notable only for its lack of clarity.
In United States v. Miller,8 the Supreme Court held that an
indictment for transporting a sawed-off shotgun in interstate
commerce without the payment of transfer taxes should not have
been dismissed by the trial court on Second Amendment grounds.
This holding came in 1939, in the wake of President Roosevelt's
unsuccessful "court-packing" plan. 19 With this backdrop, Miller can
be seen as part of the "switch in time that saved nine," a
capitulation by the Supreme Court to the Roosevelt Administration.
Only two years earlier, Roosevelt had angrily proposed to put an
end to the court's conservative tendencies by packing it with his
allies after the Court invalidated a string of President Roosevelt's
New Deal acts.20 In this atmosphere, the Supreme Court was
extremely reluctant to strike down F.D.R.'s 1934 National Firearms
Act; instead, the Court upheld the Act, but only on "the narrowest
public that the Amendment secures an individual right. See supra note 2 and its
accompanying text. Thus, the analysis of any court should stop there. Even if the Second
Amendment were legitimately ambiguous, the collective theory would no doubt be defeated
by applying the three default rules of interpretation enunciated in Printz. Historical
understanding and practice demonstrate clearly that an individual interpretation reigned
supreme and unchallenged in comment and practice until at least the mid-twentieth century.
See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLuTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT 89-153 (1984). The "structure of the Constitution" yields a similar advantage to the
individual argument because of the Amendment's placement along with other private rights
in the Bill of Rights. See also JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN
ANGLO-AMERIcAN RIGHT 159 (1996). Even "the jurisprudence of this Court" standard would
provide no solace to collective arguments because the Supreme Court's case law on the
Second Amendment is overwhelmingly favorable to an individual interpretation, in dicta if
not in holdings. See McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 2, at 878-84 (reviewing several cases);
Stephen P Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms,
1787-1823, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 347, 352 (1999) (discussing that the Supreme
Court has consistently treated the Amendment as guaranteeing an individual right, and never
anything else).
17. See David B. Kopel, et al., A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in State
Supreme Courts, 68 TEMPLE L REV. 1177, 1240 (1995).
18. 307 U.S. 174 (1934).
19. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE
ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 188 (1994).
20. See id. For an overview of the climate surrounding the Supreme Court's New Deal
jurisprudence, see Roger Roots, Note, Government by Permanent Emergency, - Suffolk U.
L. Rev. _ (2000).
2000
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of grounds."2
Because the Western District of Arkansas had dismissed the
indictment of Jack Miller and Frank Layton upon a taking of
judicial notice that a short-barreled shotgun was a military weapon,
the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that judicial notice was
in error:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than
eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly, it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is
any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use
could contribute to the common defense.
22
While the Miller opinion provided a very broad depiction of the
right to bear arms under the Second Amendment,23 its holding
provided an opening for gun control proponents to proclaim a
victory over what had almost universally been seen as a plenary
constitutional impediment. Miller did, after all, find the Second
Amendment to be no per se impediment to a gun control statute.2 4
21. Cramer, supra note 19, at 189.
22. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added).
23. Justice McReynolds's opinion discussed the meaning of "well regulated militia" at
length. McReynolds wrote that the historical background of the Second Amendment showed
"plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert
for the common defense." Id. at 179. Upon being summoned for militia duty, such men "were
expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at
the time." Id. (emphasis added).
24. It has unfortunately escaped the analysis of many scholars on every side of the
Second Amendment debate that Miller is a poor standard by which to interpret an article in
the Bill of Rights. At its essence, Miller is a procedural case that dealt with the substance of
the Second Amendment only in dicta. The very reason that no evidence of the militia-value
of shortened shotguns was introduced in Miller is that the case had been dismissed upon
demurrer (i.e., motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). See McAffee & Quinlan, supra
note 2, at 882. After the indictment against Miller and Layton was dismissed by the district
court, Miller and Layton did not even make an appearance nor file a brief before the
Supreme Court. The issue was decided against them solely on the arguments made by the
prosecution. See Cramer, supra note 19, at 188 (stating that the Second Amendment citations
given by the Miller Court were apparently only those provided by the prosecution). Note that
the Court did not say that a short-barreled shotgun was unprotected by the Second
Amendment, only that no evidence had been presented to demonstrate that such a weapon
was protected. See Michael I. Garcia, Comment, The Assault Weapons Gun, the Second
Amendment, and the Security of a Free State, 6 REG. U. L. REV. 261, 286 (1995). For that
matter, Miller's membership in any state militia was never even considered by the Supreme
Death of the Collective Right Theory
While the Miller court voiced no indication whatsoever that the
Second Amendment was unavailable as a defense to a prosecution
of an individual defendant (or even to Jack Miller), gun control
advocates have found Miller to represent the idea that the militia
clause is the controlling element of the Second Amendment. It has
remained only for gun regulation advocates to paint the
militia-nexus requirement of the Amendment (under the apparent
Miller rule)25  as eternally unreachable. The collective right
interpretation - i.e., the theory that the Second Amendment is-no
obstacle at all to gun control legislation - was only one step away.
Thus, the collective right theory was born - illegitimately, it would
seem - in 1939.
During the sixty years since Miller, lower federal courts have
taken the limited rule of the Miller case (that the Second
Amendment applies where some relationship to "a well regulated
militia" exists) and ran with it. The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits have openly embraced the collective right interpretation,
26
while the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all affirmed criminal convictions for possessing or
transacting in various firearms based upon interpretations of the
Miller holding that can best be described as injudicious.27 The
Ninth Circuit went so far in adopting the collective right theory as
to say that "[f]ollowing Miller, '[i]t is clear that the Second
Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual
Court as an issue.
25. See Garcia, supra note 24. That the Second Amendment right to keep arms
requires any nexus whatsoever with militias is almost certainly false in light of the recent
evidence produced by Professor Volokh. See supra note 15.
26. See Love v. Peppersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Warin, 530
F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976); Hickman v. Block, 81 F3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
27. Professor Nelson Lund refers to interpretations of the Second Amendment made by
such circuits as "the 'government always wins' interpretation" of the Second Amendment.
Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities and
Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEx. REV. L & PoLIIcs, 157, 184 (1999):
[This] line of cases avoids embracing the states' rights theory, but comes essentially to
the same result. The opinions in these cases typically begin with some version of
Miller's statement that the possession or use of a particular firearm must have "a
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia."
Whatever analysis follows, and there is usually not much, always puts a burden on the
claimant of Second Amendment rights to demonstrate such a relationship. And the
court always concludes that the claimant failed to make the required demonstration.
Id. at 184-85. See Cases v. United States, 131 F2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v. Toner,
728 F2d 115 (2nd Cir. 1984); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 1997); United
States v. Johnson, 441 F2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1971); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 E2d
261 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hale, 978 F2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.




In the sixty years following Miller, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly declined to clarify its interpretation of the Second
Amendment.29  Tens of thousands of Americans have been
prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for violating federal gun
control statutes.30 Until 1999, federal district and circuit courts had
never found any scenario for which the collective right or
militia-centric right to bear arms applied.31 For example, in
Gilespie v. City of Indianapolis,32 the Seventh Circuit held that
even an active-duty police officer on roll for Indiana militia service
could not invoke the Second Amendment to require his
reinstatement to armed police service after he was dismissed
pursuant to federal gun regulations:
The link that the amendment draws between the ability 'to
keep and bear Arms' and '[a] well regulated Militia' suggests
that the right protected is limited, one that inures not to the
individual but to the people collectively, its reach extending so
far as is necessary to protect their common interest in
protection by a militia.3
In another recent case, the Fraternal Order of Police, an
organization of police officers, challenged a federal law that
effectively disarmed some of their officers for committing certain
domestic violence misdemeanors 4 The D.C. Circuit disposed of the
28. Hickman, 81 F.3d at 102 (quoting United States v. Warin, 530 F2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976)).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Rybar, 103 F3d 273 (3rd Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.
46 (1997); Hickman v. Block, 81 F3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996);
Love v. Peppersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995); United
States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993); Quilici v.
Village of Morton Grove, 695 F2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983);
United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978);
United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
30. A study conducted by the Justice Department in 1993 revealed that 3177 people -
approximately 6% of all those convicted in federal court - were convicted of a federal
weapons offense in 1992. Lawrence A. Greenfeld & Marianne W. Zawitz, U.S. Department of
Justice, Weapons Offenses and Offenders 3 (1995). About 10% of felony convictions for
weapons violations occur in federal court. See id. at 5. Moreover, the increasingly lengthy
sentences handed out for firearms violations at the federal level have made weapons
offenders about three times more prevalent in federal prisons than in state prisons. See id. at
6.
31. But see notes 40-44, and their accompanying text.
32. 185 F3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
33. Gillespie, 185 F3d at 710.
34. Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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challenge, after rehearing, 35 by proclaiming that the Fraternal Order
of Police had "presented no evidence on the matter at all" and
therefore never indicated "how restrictions on [the militia service
of domestic violence misdemeanants] would have a material impact
on the militia."36 Thus, even a collective body of state officers was
denied standing as "the People" of the Second Amendment.
Gillespie and Fraternal Order of Police show that what passes
for modern Second Amendment jurisprudence allows courts to
move the goal post perpetually, lest anyone or anything claim a
right to bear arms under the Amendment. The Second Amendment
is, thus, more than just, as Brannon P. Denning asserts, a
constitutional "dead letter."37 Under the ever-metamorphasizing
collective right or "government-always-wins" interpretation, it is an
intangible, a whiff of smoke that never solidifies into a palpable
mass, a shimmering mirage that dissipates whenever approached.
Meanwhile, Congress has legislated as if the Second Amendment
offers no barrier to its actions at all. In fact, it has enacted
increasingly stringent regulations governing the sale, shipment, and
possession of firearms.38 Until 1999, none of these intrusions upon
the right to keep and bear arms had ever been struck down by a
federal court on Second Amendment grounds.
39
In 1999, a lone federal judge changed this. The decision of United
States District Judge Sam R. Cummings in United States v.
Emerson,4° now being reviewed by the United States Fifth Circuit
35. A three-judge panel of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals initially
vacated a lower court order granting summary judgment to the government in the case.
Fraternal Order of Police, 173 F3d at 898. This initial decision was predicated on a finding
that the statute in question lacked a rational basis for its harsher treatment of domestic
violence misdemeanants as compared to domestic violence felons. The panel found that the
apparent illogic doomed the statute under the federal equal protection doctrine. Id. The
same panel, composed of Judges Williams, Ginsburg, and Randolph, granted a rehearing
upon the petition of the government based on the argument that the Fraternal Order of
Police had not properly raised the argument involving § 922(g)(9)'s irrationality and that the
panel's finding was incorrect. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 159 F3d 1362
(1998).
36. Fraternal Order of Police, 173 F3d at 906 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
37. Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an "Underenforced
Constitutional Norm", 21 HARVARD J.L & PUB. PoL'Y, 719, 723 n.24 (1998).
38. In 1996, for example, Congress enacted a law prohibiting persons convicted of
domestic violence misdemeanors - whether or not such persons were ever even arrested or
jailed or had a trial - from possessing firearms for life. Those who violate face up to ten
years in federal prison. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
39. To this must be added the caveat that the lower court ruling reviewed in Miller did,
in fact, dismiss an indictment on grounds that the statute in question violated the Second
Amendment. Only upon review by the Supreme Court was the statute upheld.
40. 46 FSupp.2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
2000
Duquesne Law Review
Court of Appeals, 41 represents the first time in sixty years that a
federal court has applied the Second Amendment to strike down a
federal firearm statute.42 Cummings, a federal judge sitting in the
Northern District of Texas, found that the Second Amendment
barred the government from prosecuting a person for possessing a
firearm while under a domestic violence restraining order.43 The
decision, though based on straightforward reasoning, "shocked the
legal world."44
While the ultimate outcome of the Emerson case remains unclear
pending appeal, the case has already brought substantial
repercussions to America's gun control debate. If affirmed, the case
is likely to be considered by the Supreme Court because it will set
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals at odds with virtually every other
federal circuit.45 "[P]erhaps hundreds of laws will be in danger of
being struck down."
46
The briefs filed in the Fifth Circuit by the government in
Emerson stop short of proclaiming that the'Second Amendment
preserves a collective right. Instead, they assert the
"government-always-wins" interpretation of the Second Amendment
coined by Professor Nelson Lund.47 They argue that the Supreme
Court in Miller laid down a test - the "reasonable relationship"
test - and that Judge Cummings failed to apply this test.48
According to this interpretation of Miller, any possession of a
firearm must be reasonably related to the preservation or efficiency
of the militia before such possession will be constitutionally
protected.
49
But the evidentiary burden required by Miller appears to be a
nominal one, consisting of "any evidence" of a relationship between
a person's firearm possession and the militia.5° Only "in the absence
41. United States v. Emerson, 46 FSupp.2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999), appeal docketed, No.
99-10331 (5th Cir. 1999).
42. See Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms
Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEXAS REV. L & PoLrncs 157
(1999).
43. Emerson, 46 FSupp.2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
44. Lund, supra note 42, at 163.
45. See id. at 171-73.
46. Richard Willing, Texas Case Could Shape the Future of Gun Control, USA TODAY,
Aug. 27-29, 1999.
47. See supra note 27.
48. See Brief for the United States at 28, United States v. Emerson, __ F.3d. (5th
Cir. 2000).
49. See id. at 10.
50. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
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of any evidence" of such a relationship may a court conclude that
firearm possession is not constitutionally protected. 51 As Judge
Cummings himself wrote, "It is difficult to interpret Miller as
rendering the Second Amendment meaningless as a control on
Congress."5 2 While the post-Miller case law has been
overwhelmingly disrespectful of the right to bear arms, it cannot be
said that it followed Miller with precision.5 Indeed, "there is some
confusion among the courts . . .as to whether the Supreme Court
in [Miller] was in fact laying down a general rule at all"4 rather
51. Id. The various tests of constitutional scrutiny that are now relatively well settled
(rational basis, undue burden, strict scrutiny) arose primarily with the jurisprudence of the
second half of the twentieth. century and were not known by the Supreme Court in 1939.
Therefore, the level of scrutiny for analyzing the Amendment under Miller can still be said to
be in controversy. On this point opponents of the individual right interpretation seem thus
far to be in relatively good stead. Miller did, after all, place the burden on the claimant
rather than the government, suggesting a rational basis level of scrutiny under current
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Keith A. Ehrman and Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in
the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. Dayton L Rev. 5, 52
(1989) (citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), for the proposition that the right to
bear arms is not a fundamental right for Equal Protection purposes). While such placement
of the burden suggests an inappropriate devaluation of the Amendment in the federal courts,
it by no mens conflicts with the view that the Second Amendment protects an individual
and not a collective right.
Moreover, this devaluation of the importance of firearm ownership is almost certainly
improper in light of the history and purpose of the Amendment. Indeed, a rational basis type
of review seems antithetical to any right protected under the Bill of Rights. As Nelson Lund
has concluded, the "scheme of ordered liberty" test for determining whether an interest is a
fundamental right is "nothing but a slightly reworded version of the Second Amendment's
reference to what is 'necessary to the security of a free State.' " Nelson Lund, The Past and
Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA L REV. 1, 53 (1996). Indeed, the personal
right to bear arms stands on surprisingly better footing as a historically recognized
fundamental right than either the religion clauses of the First Amendment, the First
Amendment's right of free speech and press, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
uncompensated takings, and several Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of criminal
defendants, all of which lack the support of any fundamental documents of the (unwritten)
English Constitution, or are substantially newer in their recognition at English common law
than the right of arms ownership. See id. at 55.
52. Emerson, 46 FSupp.2d at 608 (N.D.Tex. 1999).
53. Ironically, even this is contrary to statements of collective theorists, who tend to
present post-Miller jurisprudence as uniform. See, e.g., Craco, supra note 14, at 38, 39
(stating that "[tihe federal courts have spoken with extraordinary clarity on the scope of the
Second Amendment" and that "lower federal courts have faithfully followed the Supreme
Court's teaching for decades and have upheld numerous provisions of the federal firearms
laws").
54. Miller can be seen as merely a procedure case, and its substantive ruminations
nothing more than dicta. See Cramer, supra note 19, at 189-91; see also Daniel E. Field,
Annotation, Federal Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, 37 A.L.R. Fed. 696, at 701 (1978). At,
least three different interpretations of the Miller rule exist in the federal courts. See id. at
709-10 (explaining that courts disagree on whether Miller means 1) that the Second
Amendment is not applicable without some relationship between the person bearing an arm
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than reviewing the record as to the sufficiency of evidence required
for the taking of judicial notice.1
5
The Emerson case portends the death of the collective right
theory. It hits the collective right theory where it hurts the theory
most - case law. For decades, gun control advocates have
shrugged off the Second Amendment by claiming the case law does
not support an individual right to bear arms.56 That such statements
are exaggerations of the case law has not deadened the force of
such assertions.57 Emerson poses the threat of crashing through the
and preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, 2) that the Amendment protects
only individuals bearing weapons with a reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia, or 3) that the manner of the weapon's use is the
primary determinant of applicability of the Second Amendment).
55. Judicial notice is a procedural mechanism designed to expedite cases involving
facts not in controversy. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL, CML PROCEDURE 297 (2d ed. 1993). In
taking judicial notice, a trial court recognizes the truth of certain facts without the
production of evidence. See id. The lower court in Miller took judicial notice that the
prosecution of Jack Miller violated the Second Amendment. As a matter of procedure, the
Supreme Court acted properly in reversing such judicial notice, where one party (the
government) maintained that whether a sawed-off shotgun was suitable for militia service
was in controversy.
56. See, e.g., PETE SIEus, GUNs DON'T DIE-PEOPLE Do 55 (1981) (quoting the American
Bar Association for the proposition that "every federal court decision involving the [Second]
amendment has given the amendment a collective, militia interpretation and/or held that
firearms-control laws enacted under a state's police power are constitutional.").
57. Perhaps too typical is the list of citations provided by collective right proponent
Louis A. Craco, Jr., in his article A Right to Bear Arms?. See Craco, supra note 14, at 39.
Craco provides an impressive list of a dozen case citations, all of which supposedly bolster
the collective right position. An examination of the authorities cited, however, shows that
only one of the twelve cases actually appears to stand for the proposition that the Second
Amendment provides only a collective and not an individual right. United States v. Hale, 978
F2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992), on which Craco relies heavily, actually states that "[wihether
the 'right to bear arms' for militia purposes is 'individual' or 'collective' in nature is
irrelevant"; the case was decided on the (questionable) reasoning that a machine gun is not
reasonably related to the right. United States v. Friel, 1 F.3d 1231 (1st Cir. 1993), is a mere
affirmation of a lower court decision and does not contain any published opinion. United
States v. Toner, 728 F2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984), merely states that aliens can be prosecuted
for gun violations because the right to bear arms is not a "fundamental right" of aliens.
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982), simply refused to
incorporate the Second Amendment onto the states, and expressly stated "we need not
consider the scope of its guarantee of the right to bear arms." United States v. Oakes, 564
F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977), did not say the right was a collective right but simply upheld a
firearm conviction summarily pursuant to the rule of Miller. United States v. Turcotte, 558
F.2d 893, 893 (8th Cir. 1977), dismissed a Second Amendment challenge without analysis,
merely concluding that a particular felon's firearm possession conviction "does not obstruct
the maintenance of a well regulated militia, and therefore is not violative of the Second
Amendment."
The Third Circuit opinion in United States v. Graves, 554 F2d 65, 66 n.2 (3d Cir. 1977),
actually seems to enshrine an individual interpretation, rather than a collective one, noting
that "[airguably, any regulation of firearms may be violative of this constitutional provision,"
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logjam of case law and compelling the Supreme Court to address
the meaning of the Second Amendment for the first time in three
generations. o
II. ACADEMICS CAST ASPERSIONS ON THE COLLECTIVE THEORY
The predilection of federal courts to "look the other way" when
Second Amendment issues are raised 8 has had a stunning result -
overwhelming objections by those legal scholars who have
examined the subject. In response to court cases that have
recognized the collective right doctrine as the law, dozens of
academics have become sufficiently disgruntled to compose law
review articles that, with varying degrees of outrage, have exposed
the fledgling collective right doctrine as essentially a fraud on the
human intellect.
5 9
While the academic debate is lively, it is anything but even-sided.
Legal scholarship concerning the original intent and purpose of the
Second Amendment is so overwhelmingly in favor of the individual
right interpretation that the individual interpretation is now
generally considered the "Standard Model" of the Amendment's
and that the defendant in question did not even raise the Second Amendment as a defense;
the case's dicta merely said that the courts have narrowly construed the Amehdment. United
States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976), began its analysis by "[a]greeing... that
the Supreme Court did not lay down a general rule in Miller," and then concluded that "[i]t
is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right";
only case citations, none of which announced such a finding, were provided as support.
United States v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1975), says simply that "there is no
absolute constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm." United States v. Tomlin,
454 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1972), did not analyze the issue at all but simply cited Miller to affirm
summarily a firearm conviction. United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir.
1971), likewise provided no discussion and only cited Miller in affirming a firearm
conviction. United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 772 (8th Cir. 1971), found merely that
"there is no showing that prohibiting possession of firearms by felons obstructs the
maintenance of a 'well regulated militia.' "
58. A review of the relevant district and circuit court opinions reveals that most handle
the issue summarily - with little more than a conclusory recital, often expressed in only a
single sentence or two. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 4, at 1162 (saying that many such
opinions "discuss the Second Amendment so summarily that it is impossible to say that they
are adopting any position beyond their bare holding that the Amendment does not give
felons a right to own firearms."). As Barnett and Kates point out, academic claims that a
"broad," "clear," and "striking judicial consensus" supporting the collective view exists are
made largely by "misstating opinions, misconstruing dicta as holdings, and falling to disclose
contrary opinions." Id. at 1152.
59. The sheer number of law review articles that have concluded that the Second
Amendment secures an individual right to bear arms and that present lower federal case law
is in error is now so large that a listing of them would merely waste paper and ink. See
David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L REV. 1359,
1362 n.1 (1998). To this list can now be added a number of other articles (including this
one).
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meaning. 6° The academics who defend the thrashing of the Second
Amendment in the courts do so on public policy grounds, citing
modern homicide rates, changing times, and the increasingly
frightening nature of individual resistance to perceived tyranny.61
Such defenders, when alluding to the Framers' intent, do so in a
way that is vague and improvisational rather than clear.62 Collective
right theorists who have delved deeply into the history of the
Amendment (and there have not been many) either have been
dissuaded from publicly proclaiming the theory as their own or
have used the historical record as a canvas upon which to paint an
elaborate caricature of the Founders' cultural and legalistic
worldview.
Collective right proponents point to statements made by Framers
who expressed the now-clich6d "fear of standing armies" - of
which there are many statements on record.6 This "fear of standing
armies" is said to be the justification for the Amendment's
empowerment of state militias, which would presumably act as an
armed deterrent to the standing army's tyrannical propensities
(even though such state militias - like the professional military -
are simultaneously regulated (in part) by the same entity, Congress
and the President).64 To the extent that the Second Amendment
empowers citizens collectively to deter the potential danger posed
by standing armies, Standard Model proponents do not quibble in
any way with this collective right supposition.
But there were many other statements made concerning arms
and militias during the 1780s. 65 In order to operate to the exclusion
of an individual right, the collective right doctrine seemingly
requires the utter absence of documentary evidence that the
Founders considered the Amendment as a protection of the right of
individuals. Yet rarely is a collective right scholar brazen enough to
60. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN.
L REv. 461, 463 (1995).
61. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EvIu A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DismusT OF
GOVERNMENT passim (1999); Bogus, supra note 2, at 25-27; Herz, supra note 58, passim.
62. It is a gifted academic, indeed, who can pass the theory off as legitimate in the
face of the overwhelming evidence weighing against it. But see Bogus, supra note 5, at 309;
Ehrman, supra note 51, at 5.
63. See, e.g., SHIELDS, supra note 56, at 127.
64. See the discussion accompanying notes 176-81.
65. For an exhaustive collection of ratification era documents concerning the Second
Amendment, see THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BILL
OF RIHTS 1787-1792 (David E. Young ed., 2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter OmGIN) (reprinting
hundreds of pages of such documents).
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assert that such evidence is nonexistent.66 The collective right
argument instead depends upon the suppression, or at least the
avoidance, of ratification era statements that described the right to
keep and bear arms as a fundamental individual right.67 Increasingly
dogged research has shown that the historical record is relatively
rich with statements by both the primary Founders 68 (those who
served as delegates to the ratifying conventions) and the secondary
Founders69 (those who contributed ideas, editorials, or writings
about the Constitution in public forums) expressing the viewpoint
that keeping arms was a fundamental individual right and that the
Second Amendment was designed to protect that right.
70
Such statements were made by both Federalists71 (those who
supported a stronger national government) and Anti-Federalists
72
66. But see Ehrman, supra note 51, at 7 (saying "[t]here is no evidence that the
Framers discussed, much less intended, that the amendment provide a guarantee to
individuals of a right to be armed for purposes unrelated to militia service"). Ehrman and
Henigan's article was published in 1989 and a decade of scholarship has served to refute
their statements. This did not stop Garry Wills (another strong proponent of the collective
right theory) from claiming in 1999 that "only one clear reference to private ownership from
the ratification debates" expresses the individual right view. Wills, supra note 61, at 253
(referring to the 1787 Dissent of the Minority); see also notes 166-67, and their accompanying
text. The notes that follow indicate the error of Wills's claim.
67. See A Pennsylvanian [Tench Coxe], Newspaper article, PHILADELPHIA FEDERAL
GAZETTE, June 18, 1789, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 670, 671 (stating that under
the Bill of Rights, if the government "may attempt to tyrannize . . .[and] pervert their
[military] power to the injury of their fellow-citizens, the people are confirmed by the next
article in their right to keep and bear their private arms.").
68. See MALcoLM, supra note 16, at 97 (quoting Noah Webster as saying Americans need
not fear standing armies "because the whole body of the people are armed").
69. For example, the Anti-Federalist "M.T. Cicero" wrote to the Charleston State
Gazette in September, 1788, that a well-regulated militia "composed of the freeholders,
citizen and husbandman, who take up arms to preserve their property, as individuals, and
their rights as freemen" was the best defense against tyranny. See HALBROOK, supra note 16,
at 72 (emphasis added).
70. The most contemporary known statement about the Second Amendment - a
newspaper article written by Federalist leader Tench Coxe just days after the Bill of Rights
was introduced in Congress - described the Second Amendment as an individual right. See
Kopel, supra note 16, At 351.
71. See, e.g., The Federal Farmer, May, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 354
(opining that the militia should "always be kept well organized, armed, and disciplined, and
include, according to the past and general usage of the states, all men capable of bearing
arms; and that all regulations tending to render this general militia useless and defense less,
by establishing select corps of militia, or distinct bodies of military men, . . . [should] be
avoided"); see also id. at 355 (stating that "to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole
body of the people always possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to
use them.").
72. The great Virginia Anti-Federalist George Mason asked during the Virginia debates,
"Who are the militia?" and answered, "They consist now of the whole people, except a few
public officers." 3 JONATHON ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
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(those who sought a weaker and more limited national government
and who generally opposed the Constitution unless it included a
bill of rights), both before73 and after 74 the ratification of the Bill of
Rights. As the scholarship on the Second Amendment has probed
more and more deeply into the Framers' intent, the collective right
position has been progressively undermined.75 The Founders wrote
eloquently that the militia was the whole people,7 6 including
farmers,7 mechanics,78 laborers,79 and woodsmen, s° and that it was
every man's duty to arm himself for militia duty if the government
failed to provide him with arms.81 That disarmament of citizens by
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITIMON 425-26 (2d ed. 1863).
73. See Letter from Samuel Nasson to U.S. Rep. George Thatcher, (July 9, 1789),
reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 796-97 (expressing support for a bill of rights that
would secure "the right to keep arms for Common and Extraordinary Occasions such as to
secure ourselves against the wild Beast and also to amuse us by fowling and for our Defense
against a Common Enemy").
74. Years after the constitutional debates, James Madison wrote that "a government
resting on a minority is an aristocracy, not a Republic, and could not be safe with a
numerical and physical force against it, without a standing army, and enslaved press, and a
disarmed populace." RALPH L KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 64, 640 (1971).
75. See Kopel, supra note 16, at 351 (expressing that as the Standard Model has
become the consensus choice among legal scholars, the collective right view has "nearly
vanished from the legal literature").
76. See, e.g., James Madison's depiction in The Federalist Papers of "a militia
amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands." ORIGIN, supra note 65,
at 234. See also Mr. Corbin's remarks at the Virginia Convention (stating "Who are the
militia? Are we not militia?"). A Federalist, June 7, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65,
at 375. A large number of similar remarks also testify to this same proposition. See ORIGIN,
supra note 65, t 190 (stating that "Tyrants never feel secure until they have disarmed the
people .... But the people of this country have arms in their hands; . . . every citizen is
required by law to be a soldier"); see also A Pennsylvanian III, PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA
GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 276 (stating "Who are these
militia? are they not our selves.").
77. See An American [Tench Coxe], reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 185 (saying
that "the number of people employed in agriculture, is at least nine parts in ten of the
inhabitants of America, that therefore the planters and farmers form the body of the militia,
the bulwark of the nation.").
78. See Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, The Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Congtitutional Theory, 16
CONswrITmONAL COMMENTARY 221, 239 (1999) (citing William Petrikin as accusing authorities of
trying to disarm farmers, mechanics, and "labourers"). Cornell cites Petrildn's remarks for
the proposition that the arms of such persons were subject to confiscation by the state. The
same remarks, however, stand for the proposition that people saw potential disarmament as
an ever-present danger that was abhorrent to republican values.
79. See id.
80. See Letter from Franklin County, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, April 30,
1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 339 (saying that with "ten days warning,
TWENTY THOUSAND expert woodsmen, completely armed" could be called upon in the
wooded counties of Pennsylvania).
81. See An Old Militia Officer of 1776, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETrEER, Jan. 18,
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the government was contemplated 2 and that the absence in the
pre-amendment constitution of an express protection of the right to
keep arms was troubling to members of the public cannot be
denied.83 It is noteworthy that Federalist defenders of the
pre-amendment constitution offered the natural right to bear arms
as the reason that no bill of rights was needed.84 Others wrote that
the right to bear arms was a protection for other freedoms such as
those of speech and religion.s-
If the Framers had intended the Second Amendment to secure
1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 221-22 (writing that if orders to turn in
state-owned arms for cleaning and repair are suspicious, "will it not be their indispensable
duty, as men, as citizens, and as guardians of their own rights, immediately to arm
themselves at their own expense?").
82. See the Anti-Federalist satire entitled and signed James De Caledonia IV,
PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN'S JOURNAL, March 12, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 298
(depicting a satirical claim by a fictitious well-born noble (who was probably meant to
suggest the Federalist ratification promoter James Wilson) "I wish all the arms were
collected."); see also the satirical pamphlet THE GOVERNMENT OF NATURE DELINEATED OR AN
ExAcT PICTURE OF THE NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, April 15, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra
note 65, at 334 (saying that "[tihe militia must be disarmed; for this purpose all the public
arms must be called in, upon pretence of having them cleaned").
83. See Common Sense, NEW YORK JOURNAL AND DAILY ADVERTISER, April 21, 1788,
reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 790 (complaining that the pre-amendment constitution
may deprive "a citizen" of "the privilege of keeping arms for his own defense").
84. See Federal Farmer, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 298 (noting
that the yeomanry of the country possess arms "and are too strong a body of men to be
openly offended - and, therefore, it is urged, they will take care of themselves, that men
who shall govern will not dare pay any disrespect to their opinions."). For a variety of
similar sentiments, see documents collected in ORIGIN, supra note 65. See also The
Republican, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 190 (stating that "Tyrants
never feel secure until they have disarmed the people.... But the people of this country
have arms in their hands; . . . every citizen is required by law to be a soldier"); A
Pennsylvanian III, Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 276 (stating that
"Congress have [sic] no power to disarm the militia. Their swords, and every other terrible
implement of the soldier, are the birthright of an American."); Alexander White, WINCHESTER
VIRGINIA GAzETrE, Feb. 22, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 281 (stating that
"There are other things so clearly out of the power of Congress, that the bare recital of them
is sufficient, I mean the rights of conscience, or religious liberty - the rights of bearing
arms for defense, or for killing game - the liberty of fowling, hunting and fishing . . .");
Alexander White, WINCHESTER VIRGINIA GAZErrE, Feb. 29, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra
note 65, at 288 (stating that "In America it is the governors not the governed that must
produce their Bills of Rights: unless they can shew the charters under which they act, the
people will not yield obedience.").
85. See Argus, PROVIDENCE UNITED STATES CHRONICLE, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in ORIGIN,
supra note 65, at 84 (saying that freedom of the press is a privilege "for which (among
others) we have fought and bled, and for which I would again shoulder my Musket.").
Toward the same reasoning, Zachariah Johnson told the Virginia convention that their
liberties would be safe because "the people are not to be disarmed of their weapons" and
should anyone attempt to infringe upon the people's religious liberty, he would "be
universally detested and opposed, and easily frustrated." Malcolm, supra note 16, at 157.
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only a collective right and not an individual right, they picked a
poor set of words to convey their intent. For that matter, if they
had designed the Amendment to secure to the states their right to
form militias, they should have used different phraseology. They
could have easily substituted "the states" or "the militia" for the
phrase "the people," for example.8 6 The first United States Senate,
upon returning to Philadelphia in the summer of 1789 to draft a Bill
of Rights, rejected one proposal to add the words "for the common
defense" after "keep and bear Arms," and thus passed the
Amendment with no such limitation.
8 7
As the collective right position has retreated from reliance on the
Framers' intent, its proponents have switched to more crafty
historical arguments. They see government control in every
Founder's reference to the individual right to bear arms and take
pains to place every such expression into the "context" of
government supervision.88 In one recent article, published along
with a triumvirate of articles praising its "fresh insights into the
intellectual and social context of the Second Amendment," 9
historian Saul Cornell claims to offer evidence that the Founders
understood the right to bear arms to be conditioned upon
permission from the state9°  Specifically, Cornell cites the
Pennsylvania "Test Acts" of the 1770s for the proposition that many
Framers "believed that one could exclude large numbers of
individuals from the right of gun ownership."91
The Test Acts were passed in the heat of wartime in 1777 and
1778 as British General Howe threatened to invade and take
Pennsylvania.9 2 They required loyalty oaths for voting, holding
86. See Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke From the Right to Bear Arms and the
Second Amendment, 29 AKRON L REV. 57, 70 (1995).
87. Id.
88. In The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen -Your Militia
Lately?, Dennis Henigan and coauthor Keith Ehrman claim that "[i]n no sense can it be
confidently stated that [state declarations of a right to bear arms prior to the ratification of
the federal bill of rights] were concerned with an individual right to bear arms for anything
other than milita-related purposes." Ehrman, supra note 65, at 18. Elsewhere in the same
article, the authors claim that "while the term 'militia' may have referred in some contexts to
the citizenry as a whole, in the context of the Bill of Rights debate, it referred to organized,
trained, and government-supplied militias." Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
89. Robert E. Shalhope, To Keep and Bear Arms in the Early Republic, 16
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 269, 270-71 (1999).
90. Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, The Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16
CONSTTUIONAL COMMENTARY 221 (1999).
91. Id. at 237.
92. See ALAN AXELROD, THE COMPLETE IDIoT's GUIDE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 209-18
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public office, and serving on juries, to weed out "persons
disaffected to the liberty and independence of this state," (loyalists
to the British Crown)Y3 These Test Acts, according to Cornell,
prove that only citizens who were willing to swear an oath to the
state could claim the right to bear arms.94 "Gun ownership in
Pennsylvania was thus predicated on a rejection of the very right of
armed resistance posited by the Standard Model."95 Cornell states
that "perhaps as much as forty percent of the citizenry" were
stripped of "many essential rights"96 by the Acts (a reviewer
extrapolated from this misleading statement that the Acts "had the
ultimate effect of disarming as much as 40 percent of the
citizenry").97 Although Cornell criticizes Standard Modelers for
omitting discussion of the Test Acts, and for failing to consult two
specific historical works (one of them a 1942 book on local history,
the other a published dissertation),98 nothing in the works Cornell
cites mentions a single case where the right to bear arms was
legally trumped by the Test Acts in any court of law.9
III. THE TEST ACTS - INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?
Cornell downplays the wartime context of the Test Acts as an
explanation for their intrusion upon civil liberties 1° even though
such intrusions are hardly unique for governments in wartime. 10'
The Acts, however, can hardly be understood outside their wartime
context. 10 2 Nor does Cornell reconcile the impact of the Acts on
(2000) (summarizing the invasion of Philadelphia).
93. Cornell, supra note 90, at 228 n.30 (citing 9 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania
110-14) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 229.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 228.
97. Chris Mooney, Showdown: Liberal Legal Scholars Are Supporting the Right to
Bear Arms, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 2000, at 29.
98. Cornell, supra note 90, at 229 n.33.
99. In pursuit of authority for Cornell's claim, I consulted Cornell's own book The
Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828. SAuL
CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION (1999). While
illuminating, the book does not provide any evidence that anyone was actually denied the
right to bear arms under the Test Acts. It seems that, although the Acts allowed for the
disarming of loyalists, the historical record is virtually devoid of recorded complaints over
such disarming - suggesting that instances of it were rare.
100. Id. at 228. Cornell states that "[bioth the timing and language of the Acts suggests
that they were not simply [wartime measures], but a reflection of a particular republican
ethos that was antithetical to modern liberal ideas about rights." Id.
101. See Roots, supra note 20.
102. After cessation of hostilities in 1786, the Acts were amended to permit full
citizenship to all men except those who had aided the British in the Revolution. ROBERT L
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holding public office, voting, or transferring real estate with the
protections for such rights that are found in the Bill of Rights.
Reconciliation, however, is exceedingly simple when considering
the setting for the Test Acts.
The Test Acts were enacted by the ultra-patriotic Pennsylvania
Assembly while the Commonwealth's independence was just days
old and being contested by military force. The Acts declared that
all voters in the fall elections would be required to take an oath to
uphold the new government.'0 3 Large numbers of Pennsylvanians
refused the oath because either they remained loyal to Britain or
objected to the structure of the new Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 4
The British invaded and occupied Philadelphia (both the state
capital and the fledgling nation's capital) on September 23, 1777.
Congress fled in haste to Baltimore 0 5 as many locals deserted the
Patriots' cause and fled to the side of Britain.106
With a pressing need for both men and arms to fight in the
Revolution, the Patriots enacted further legislation ordering all men
aged sixteen to fifty under arms (except conscientious objectors
who paid fines). 10 7 The Assembly dropped the oath requirement for
those who would take positions in the militia, but enacted further
Test Acts requiring voters to swear an oath renouncing fidelity to
King George III, pledging allegiance to Pennsylvania, and promising
to bring traitorous conspiracies against the United States to the
attention of local justices of the peace.108 "When arms were needed
for the militia to repel invasion, they were seized from those who
had not taken the oath."1°9
Cornell's thesis (that the Test Acts show the Founders'
willingness to violate the right to bear arms - and thus the
normalcy of such violations in the ratification era) is undermined
by a reading of the sources Cornell cites for his proposition.
Although the Pennsylvania Assembly suspended habeas corpus and
BRUNHOUSE, THE CoUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA 1776-1790 180-81 (1942). This
amendment contained a preamble with a passage explaining the original restrictions as a war
necessity. Id. The Acts were abolished by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1789, allowing even
persons who refused to denounce the British Crown to be citizens if they swore allegiance
to Pennsylvania Id. at 197.
103. Id. at 16.
104. See id. at 16-30.
105. See id. at 23.
106. See id. at 24.
107. See BRUNHOUSE, supra note 102, at 23.
108. Id. at 39-41.
109. Id. at 41.
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granted sweeping powers to Patriot officials to confiscate property
and arrest suspected spies and traitors, such officials were far
more respectful of the right of individuals to possess private arms
than was the invading British army, which disarmed the population
of Philadelphia during its occupation.110 Even the right to put on
theatrical entertainment was curtailed in the atmosphere of
Pennsylvania's war for survival - yet Cornell draws no correlation
to the meaning of the First Amendment."'
Nor is the record clear that disarmament of the disloyal was in
any way general. When a patriotic mob descended upon the home
of a Tory-friendly author, the author "armed himself and defied the
assailants" until they dispersed."' In October 1779, when patriotic
fervor ran so hot that radical Patriots laid plans to seize the wives
and children of Pennsylvania Tories who had gone over to the
enemy and to ship them to New York, a patriotic mob formed at
the home of wealthy conservative James Wilson to accost Wilson
and others who were perceived as sympathetic to the Tories.13 The
mob came accompanied by a militia and two cannons, but were
met by Wilson and others who "awaited with arms."" 4 Several
persons were killed or wounded when the militia-mob broke into
Wilson's home; order was not restored until Commonwealth
President Reed and a horse troop galloped to the scene and
arrested the militiamen."15 The incident shows that the Pennsylvania
Test Laws - contrary to the Cornell thesis - were not broad-scale
gun control acts and that many guns were kept by opponents of
the Pennsylvania government.
IV. THE SCHOLARSHIP OF CoLLEcTIvE RIGHT THEORISTS
The collective right theory will die because even its foremost
proponents do not claim the theory as their own."6 Instead, they
110. See Kopel, supra note 16, at 355.
111. See BRUNHOUSE, supra note 102, at 147, 169 (mentioning Revolution era ban on
Philadelphia theater company).




116. Andrew Herz, author of the controversial 1995 article that vociferously attacked
Standard Model proponents, distanced himself from openly sapporting the collective right
theory and instead claimed to support the "narrow individual right" view of the Second
Amendment. See Andrew Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and
Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 61 (1995). As Randy Barnett and
Don Kates point out, however, Herz's "narrow individual right" is the collective right in
disguise because Herz fails to acknowledge that individuals may possess arms outside the
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write only that "the courts" believe in the theory.1 7 In turn, those
courts that have provided their rationales for adopting the
collective right theory have cited either (erroneously) to the Miller
case,118 or to scholars who do not themselves faithfully subscribe to
the theory. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently denied a Second Amendment challenge by citing Keith
Ehrman and Dennis Henigan as authorities for the collective right
theory while simultaneously ignoring a much larger number of
Standard Model scholars." 9 But Ehrnan and Henigan - though
strong opponents of a broad individual right to bear arms - stop
short of adopting the collective right theory as their own;12° instead,
they state that "[tihe courts repeatedly [have held] that the right
guaranteed by the second amendment [sic] is not an individual
right, but rather a 'collective' right."'
Collective right proponents take pains to paint the Constitution
in "living" terms - emphasizing the changing nature of the
document or the outdated nature of private arms ownership.
22
Ehrman and Henigan join other anti-Standard Modelers in painting
the history of the Second Amendment in vague terms that suggest
that the Amendment was designed to operate only as prescribed by
sanction of government. Law professor Carl T. Bogus, arguably the
most prominent Second Amendment scholar who opposes the
Standard Model, has offered a variety of arguments to reconcile the
collective right theory with the historical record refuting it. Bogus
suggests that much of the public dialogue surrounding the
Constitution's ratification, including the statements of both
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and even the Federalist Papers,
express permission of the state. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 1204-05.
117. See Bogus, supra note 2, at 27 (stating that "[tihe courts have consistently held
that this guarantees only a collective right, that is, it gives states the right to have armed
militias, not individuals the right to own guns.").
118. See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 440 F2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (citing Miller
for the proposition that the Second Amendment "applies only to the right of the State to
maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms"). That this case misstates
the rule of Miller is explained in the text accompanying notes 50-55.
119. Hickman v. Block, 81 F3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
120. See Ehrman, supra note 51, at 47 (saying "[i]t may well be that the right to keep
and bear arms is individual in the sense that it may be asserted by an individual").
121. Id. at 46. Ehrman and Henigan concede that "it may well be that the right to keep
and bear arms is individual in the sense that it may be asserted by an individual" but
maintain that the Amendment is "distinguishable from other parts of the Bill of Rights
because it protects a public interest, not a private interest." Id. at 47.
122. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 116, at 66 (stating that "we need not read the Second
Amendment exclusively through the eyes of a small group of white property-owning males
who lived in a world utterly different than our own.").
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was disingenuous.' Thus, the Founders' statements regarding the
Second Amendment were an elaborate code. They masked hidden
political maneuvering, compromises supportive of slavery, and an
elaborate conspiracy of silence.
24
Bogus suggests that the Framers plotted in secret to lay the
Second Amendment into the Bill of Rights in encrypted form as a
slavery provision, and posits that the Amendment's meaning can be
discerned, not from recorded history, but from what went
unrecorded during ratification of the Amendment. "The story of the
Second Amendment ... is a tale of political struggle, strategy, and
intrigue ... [which] has been hidden because neither [Madison] nor
those he was attempting to outmaneuver politically, laid their
motives on the table." 25  Bogus alleges that the Second
Amendment's "hidden history" reveals it to have been part of the
slavery compromise. 26 In addition, Bogus argues that the Richmond
Convention in June 1788 was punctuated by unexpressed fears that
the proposed federal government would attempt to destroy the
slave system. 27 As a result, according to Bogus, the later-enacted
Second Amendment was an avenue for Southerners and
Anti-Federalists, who had lost out in the overall design of the
Constitution, to assert a buffer provision against the military power
of the federal government.
1 28
Unfortunately for this line of reasoning, a secret or "hidden"
history is neither binding nor helpful in interpreting a constitutional
provision. Nor is it nearly as clear, as Bogus suggests, that slavery
supporters cowed at stating their support openly during the
ratification debates 29 The Constitution does, after all, contain
slavery provisions that were expressed (and thus "unhidden") in the
123. See Bogus, supra note 5, at 401 (suggesting Hamilton, Madison, and Jay departed
from their private views and wrote The Federalist Papers solely as a work of advocacy).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 315.
126. Id. at 371. According to Bogus, the Second Amendment deserves a place alongside
(1) the fugitive slave provision, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, (2) the provision prohibiting
Congress from abolishing the African slave trade until 1808 or imposing an import tax of
more than ten dolers per slave, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, and (3) the provisions counting
slaves as three-fifths of free persons for apportionment purposes, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Id. at 371.
127. Id. at 344-47.
128. See Bogus, supra note 5, at 344-47.
129. Bogus points out that the words "slaves" and "slavery" do not appear anywhere in
the Constitution. Id. at 373. This omission was intended to "make the Constitution more
palatable to the North." Id. (quoting Paul Finkleman). But the Founders themselves admitted




text - albeit in stifled wording.1 30 While these slavery provisions
may contain "inscrutable language that the people could not readily
understand,"13' they nonetheless were understood by people of the
Founders' era as slavery provisions. Bogus's own writings yield
scant primary evidence (which would be needed to take his
argument on its face) of either any similar understanding regarding
the Second Amendment or any secret correspondence among
slavery supporters evidencing the notion that the Second
Amendment was intended to enable slave states to obstruct the
federal government should abolitionists ever gain control of it.
Equally controversial is the approach taken by Michael Bellesiles,
a history professor at Emory University who has contributed much
to the collective right argument. 32 Bellesiles has mined the
historical record for evidence that the Founders were gun
controllers and found what seems at first impression to be hard
evidence in favor of such a proposition.13 After scrutinizing
Bellesiles's examples, however, one must conclude that they consist
largely of colonial measures enacted during community conflicts or
emergencies (such as when arms and powder shortages required
strict limits on firing of guns required for communal defense), M
regulations pertaining to arms purchased and provided (and thus
owned) by authorities for use in community activities,135 or statutes
applicable only to slaves, freed slaves, indentured servants or
Indians136  - hardly surprising in light of the historical
130. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (stating that "[r]epresentative and direct Taxes shall
be apportioned [according to the number of free Persons plus] three fifths of all other
Persons."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (stating that "[tihe Migration or Importation of such
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited
by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight .... ."); U.S. CONsT.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (stating that "[n]o Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party
to whom such Service or Labour may be due.").
131. Bogus, supra note 5, at 373 (quoting Paul Finleman).
132. See Michael A. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amendment,
16 CONST. COMMENTARY 247 (1999) [hereinafter Suicide Pact]; The Origins of American Gun
Culture in the United States, 1760-1865, 83 J. OF Am. Hs. 425 (1996) [hereinafter Gun
Culture]; Gun Laws in Early America: The Regulation of Firearm Ownership, 1607-1794,
16 L & HiST. REV. 567 (1998) [hereinafter Gun Laws].
133. See Gun Laws, supra note 132.
134. See, e.g., id. at 583 (describing Connecticut's prohibition of firing guns, except for
defense, in 1675 during King Philip's War).
135. See id. at 585 (describing a 1763 Connecticut assembly order requiring deputies to
impound and then sell guns belonging to Connecticut).
136. See id. at 584 (describing Virginia's 1642 decrees that no one sell guns to Indians).
It is noteworthy, also, that none of Bellesiles's examples would have been subject to the
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non-universality of constitutional protections in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (religious, speech, electoral, property, and
other rights were likewise denied to such groups). Bellesiles has
also studied eighteenth century probate records and concluded that
rates of firearm ownership were much lower than popular
perceptions would suggest - perhaps as low as fourteen percent.37
Bellesiles's study, however, did not count firearms transferred
outside probate, which may have been substantial in number.
13
The research and insights of Bogus, Bellesiles, Cornell, and
others may provide assistance, but do not establish that the
Founders viewed arms possession by the common citizen as
subject to the graces of the state. At most, these historical insights
establish that the Second Amendment protects a collective right to
join in armed association on behalf of the state as well as
protecting an individual right to possess private arms. While these
scholars' writings are thought provoking, they do very little to
refute or explain the writings of ratification contemporaries
evidencing the view that the Second Amendment preserved an
individual right to keep and bear arms without leave from any
government.
The published article written by the leading Pennsylvania
Federalist, Tench Coxe, just days after Madison's introduction of
the Bill of Rights - and during the consideration of and debate on
the Bill of Rights - is probably the best single piece of evidence of
the Second Amendment's meaning to the Founders and the
Founding Generation. 139 The article described and praised each of
the proposed rights. Regarding Madison's provision that later
became the Second Amendment, Coxe wrote that:
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people, duly before
Second Amendment anyway because the Second Amendment has not been applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
137. See Gun Culture, supra note 132.
138. See id. at 427-28 (admitting probate records are not a "perfect source" for such
information).
139. Stephen P Halbrook and David B. Kopel, two of the foremost authorities on the
Second Amendment, describe Tench Coxe's contribution to the Second Amendment debate
as being so irrefutable that it essentially resolves the debate in favor of an individual right
construction. See Kopel, supra note 16, at 348. Tench Coxe wrote more than anyone else
about the right to bear arms during the ratification era. See id. Coxe wrote numerous widely
circulated articles about the right to bear arms and the Constitution over the course of his
lifetime, all of which expressed the opinion that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right. See id.
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them, may attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces
which shall be occasionally raised to defend our country,
might pervert their power to the injury of their fellow-citizens,
the people are confirmed by the next article in their right to
keep and bear their private arms.
14
His article appeared in one of the most prominent newspapers in
Philadelphia - the very city where the First Congress met to ratify
the Bill of Rights. In fact, it appeared during the same period when
Madison's proposed Bill of Rights was under consideration. Further
bolstering the authoritative credibility of this single piece of
evidence, Coxe actually sent a copy of the article to Madison
himself, who congratulated and thanked Coxe for "the co-operation
of your pen."'
4 '
Bogus, Bellesiles and their comrades are now among a rather
isolated group of scholars - and even they have, for the most part,
retreated from solidly backing the collective theory as an exclusive
proposition. 42 The vast majority of recent scholarship has pointed
out that for all of its allure among today's bar and bench, the
collective right theory is, for the most part, an outlaw notion,
baseless in terms of known history.143 The statements, letters, and
publications of the Founders and the Founding Generation are so
replete with evidence that the right to have arms was considered
an individual right secured to each citizen, that no single law
review article could possibly restate such a record. 144
140. A Pennsylvanian, PHILADELPuHIA FEDERAL GAZE7rE, June 18, 1789, reprinted in
ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 670, 671 (emphasis added). One should note that Coxe's use of the
term "bear" in context with an individual's Second Amendment rights also represents a direct
refutation of an argument made by some collective right theorists that the phrase "bear
arms" means only the use of arms in the military context. See, e.g., Wis, supra note 61, at
256-60.
141. Madison to Coxe, June 24, 1789, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 673, 674.
142. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. The third and most celebrated of
Bogus's widely-circulated Second Amendment writings concludes, "I do not in this Article
take any position with respect to 'original intent.' " Bogus, supra note 5, at 408. Bellesiles's
most recent work on the Second Amendment begins with "There are many ways of reading
the past" and then descends into a lengthy diatribe about how historical evidence should
never be read to grant a "monopoly on truth." See Suicide Pact, supra note 132, at 247-50.
143. See Kopel, supra note 16, at 352 (saying there is no writing from 1787 to 1793 that
states the collective right thesis).
144. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 86, at 70-72 (pointing to letters from Madison's
associates and contemporaries, statements made by John Adams in defense of the new
Constitution, writings of early congressmen about the right to bear arms, and newspaper
accounts of the amendments).
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V. THE STRUGGLE FOR RATIFICATION
The Constitution was hammered out at the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia between May and September 1787. Its
drafters met on the second floor of the Philadelphia Statehouse
(now known as Independence Hall) with windows shut, sentries
posted below, and delegates sworn to strict silence. 45 The States
had chosen seventy-four delegates, nineteen of whom refused to
attend, leaving only fifty-five. 146 Most were cosmopolitan and
personally anxious for a stronger national government; the
American countryside was grossly underrepresented. 47 Before the
end of the Convention, fourteen delegates left, leaving forty-one,
three of whom refused to sign.148 Thus, nearly half refused to
attend, left, or did not sign. 49 The document that was circulated for
ratification in the winter of 1787-1788 came largely with the onus
that it was a Federalist statement (i.e., that it was being promoted
by the advocates of a more centralized government).
Opponents of this constitution cited to a number of objectionable
aspects of it. In particular, the document provided no express
limitations on the powers of the national government and did not
enumerate a list of natural rights that the government could not
infringe, such as freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure, and freedom of religion. The right to bear arms
was occasionally, if not always, listed among these rights. 50
The document also contained provisions for federal military
power that greatly concerned much of the reading public. It
empowered Congress to employ a professional, or standing, army
and allowed for the organizing, arming, and disciplining by
Congress of civilian militia units when such units were called up to
serve the national government. Those suspicious of centralized
145. See KENNETH W. ROYCE, HOLOGRAM OF LIBERTY: THE CONSTrTUTON'S SHOCKING ALLIANCE
WrrH BIG GOVERNMENT 2/11 (1997).
146. Id. at 2/16.
147. Id. at 2/12. The Philadelphia delegates were a much different body from that
which had previously led the nascent republic. Only eight had signed the Declaration of
Independence, and six the Articles of Confederation. Id. The most famous revolutionaries,
including Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Patrick Henry, Thomas Paine, and
Christopher Gadsen, were not delegates. Id.
148. Id. at 2/16.
149. Id.
150. See Letter from Jeremy Belknap to Rep. Paine Wmgate (May 29, 1789) reprinted
in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 795 (speaking of the insertion of a clause "to provide for the
Liberty of the press - the right to keep arms - Protection from seizure of person &
property & the Rights of Conscience").
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authority were relentless in their criticism of these provisions. 151
They argued that the provisions would allow the national
legislature to order local militias into theaters of war far from
home, to virtually enslave militiamen by keeping them in service
for extended periods and under total control, and to discipline
militiamen arbitrarily or inhumanely. 15 2 There were also fears that
the provision granting Congress the power to arm the militias
would allow Congress to let the militias atrophy by arming them
inadequately, or by not arming them at all.'-
In each state where ratification was at issue, Federalists and
Anti-Federalists battled over these military provisions. It is from
these debates over the propriety of a standing army that collective
right proponents draw each and every one of the quips, quotes, and
anecdotes that they use as evidence that the Second Amendment
right to bear arms was intended to be reserved solely to the states
- a proposition that was stated nowhere in the debates in
question. 151 While collective right proponents admit to their readers
that there was no recorded debate over the right to bear arms
during the ratification controversy, 15 they-insist that these debates
over the structure of the United States military are authoritative
as to the meaning of the Second Amendment.
Even the occasional concession that there was no debate over
the personal right to bear arms during ratification is somewhat
deceptive. 156 A more realistic statement would be that no "debate"
151. See id. (reprinting numerous documents expounding upon criticisms of the
Constitution's militia provisions).
152. See, e.g., Centinel III, newspaper excerpt from PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT
GAZETrEER, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 85 (arguing that under the
militia provisions, militiamen "may be made as mere machines as Prussian soldiers"); John
Smilie, Pennsylvania Convention Debates, Dec. 6, 1787, rerprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65,
at 145-46 (saying the militia clauses will allow Congress to form a select militia "which will,
in fact, be a standing army" or even "may say there shall be no militia at all" and that
"[wihen a select militia is formed; the people in general may be disarmed.").
153. Id.
154. See HALBROO& supra note 16 (citing a collection of historical records at the
University of Wisconsin, "probably the most complete in the world on the subject," that
contains "not one iota of evidence that the Second Amendment was intended to guarantee
solely and exclusively a collective right and not an individual right.").
155. See, e.g., Ehrman, supra note 51, at 20 (saying "[n]owhere in the Constitutional
debates was there a discussion of a right to keep or bear arms.").
156. Both Standard Model and collective theorists are in error when they allege that
the personal right to bear arms was never discussed during the ratification struggle.
Although it was at issue only rarely, it did figure in the concerns of the Pennsylvania
minority who submitted their proposed bill of rights in December, 1787. The minority's
proposed amendment number seven stated that "the people have a right to bear arms for the
defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
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over the issue was joined because all parties agreed. There were,
in fact, a variety of unchallenged statements made in the public
forum advancing the proposition that bearing arms was a
fundamental, natural, and individual right of American citizens.
There was no debate over the mutual understanding that the militia
was the whole people, 157 that the people enjoyed a right to keep
and bear arms, and that no special sanction was needed for the
keeping of personal arms. No militia-centric view of the right to
bear arms was contemplated by either those who supported or
those who opposed ratification.
As the proposed constitution made its way around the circuit of
states, its attackers gained momentum.15 A sizeable percentage of
delegates indicated they would support ratification only if a
declaration or bill of rights were amended into it.159 It soon became
evident that the Constitution would not be ratified unless
assurances were given that a bill of rights with agreeable terms
would soon be attached upon the document's successful return to
game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies in the
time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military
shall be kept under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil power." See ORIGIN,
supra note 65, at 160. This proposed amendment was separate and distinct from proposed
amendment eleven, which stated that "the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia . . , remain[s] with the individual states . . ." Id. The persistent Pennsylvanians
published a letter in the Philadelphia Packet newspaper saying they submitted proposed
amendment number seven because of the fear that "the personal liberty of every man
probably from sixteen to sixty years of age may be destroyed by the power Congress [has] in
[the] organizing and governing of the militia." Id. at 174.
157. Madison's original version of the amendment, like many of the declarations
submitted by the states, described the militia as comprised of the body of the people. See
Malcolm, supra note 16, at 162-63.
158. See, e.g., Agrippa III, Article in BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 1787,
reprinted in OmGIN, supra note 65, at 123 (reporting that ratification of the Constitution in
New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania seems problematic without major alterations in the
text, and asking "is it not . . . better to recommit it to a new convention . . . than the
endeavour to force it through in its present form ... ?").
159. George Turner, in a letter to Winthrop Sargent on Nov. 6, 1787, stated that:
There are two parties here upon the momentous Business now agitating independent
America. One party sees nothing but Danger and Mischief in the proposed
Constitution; while the other extols it as a Chef d'oeuvre in Politics. In this Case, as in
almost every other, there is a middle walk to be trodden, as the directest Road to
Truth. For my part, I like the Outlines of the Plan, and, being a Friend to Energy of
Government, I approve of most of the Powers proposed to be given. But, as a Friend
to the natural Rights of Man, I must hold up my Hand against others. There are
certain great and unalienable Rights (which I need not enumerate to you) that should
have been secured by a Declaration or Bill of Rights. . . . [In my Opinion, such a
Declaration [is] an indispensable Condition ....
ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 83-84.
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The final result of the ratification conventions was an utter
failure for those who had sought to remove the national standing
army provisions from the text of the Constitution.1 6' The document
we now know as the Constitution was formally ratified by a
recalcitrant Rhode Island on May 29, 1790. After this final
ratification, the work of drafting a bill of rights began in earnest.
It was not necessary to prepare a bill of rights from scratch,
however. More than a dozen lists of rights were offered by various
writers throughout the debates on the Constitution. 62 Indeed, many
existing state constitutions already contained bills of rights.'63 Many
such bills of rights either contained a right to keep arms that would
be difficult to construe as anything but individual and/or defined
160. The combined number of votes from all of the conventions indicates that 34% of
convention delegates approved of the Constitution just as it was and an additional 30%
favored ratification with proposed amendments. Id. at app. C. Only by combining were these
two groups (totaling 64%) able to gain iatification. Id. The largest voting bloc (36%) was that
of delegates who were against the Constitution unless it was amended prior to ratification.
Id. According to these figures, a significant majority (66%) required amendments. See id.
(providing statistics from the twelve state conventions which met in 1787 and 1788).
161. It is noteworthy that those who debated the value of including a bill of rights, and
who addressed themselves upon matters pertaining to both military and personal arms
possession issues, seemed to reconcile the two issues very well. Philadelphia Federalist
Tench Coxe, for example, strongly supported a national professional military yet spoke and
wrote eloquently of the importance of individual gun ownership. See Kopel, supra note 16, at
348 (saying Coxe wrote more than anyone else about the right to bear arms).
162. It cannot be said that the notion of the individual right to keep arms was not at
issue during the ratification of the Bill of Rights. By early January 1788, five states -
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut - had ratified the
Constitution, although only after contentious debates over its lack of a bill of rights.
Pennsylvania had been a close call; a vocal minority had almost disrupted passage by
demanding a list of rights - including both a personal right to arms clause and a limitation
on standing armies clause. Massachusetts ratified, but only after attaching a list of
recommended amendments, including a broad reservation to the states of all powers not
delegated to the federal government. Shortly thereafter, the New Hampshire convention
adopted the nine Massachusetts amendments and added three of its own: one to limit
standing armies, one to ensure the individual's right to have arms, and one to protect
freedom of conscience. See Malcolm, supra note 16, at 158. Virginia, New York and North
Carolina all drew up lists of amendments, many patterned after the Virginia Declaration of
Rights. The Virginia arms amendment provided that "the People have a right to keep and
bear Arms" and that a militia composed of the body of the people "capable of bearing arms"
is the proper and safe defense "of a free state." Id. at 159.
163. See ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 747-80 (showing text of pre-ratification bills of rights
in the states). See also McAffee, supra note 2, at 818 (stating that "[w]e are unaware . .. of
any evidence suggesting that the Second Amendment was intended to have a different
meaning than the amendment proposed by the Virginia state ratifying convention, from
which James Madison drafted the Second Amendment."). The Virginia ratifying convention's
proposal "included both clauses of what became the Second Amendment, but neither its
language nor structure suggest that the two clauses lack independent force." Id.
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the militia as essentially all adult males. 1 The Pennsylvania
Statehouse was already well suited for the consideration of such
proposals, having been the site of ratification of a state constitution
in 1776 that recognized the arms right for both personal and state
defense,1 6 as well as having been the scene of introduction for one
of the first proposed national bills of rights at the original
ratification convention in 1787.' That proposed bill of rights,
known as the Pennsylvania Minority Bill of Rights, included two
separate clauses that are relevant to this discussion. The first
clause was intended to eliminate or limit the standing army
provisions of the Constitution; the other clause was intended to
secure eternal acknowledgment of the right to keep and bear arms
"for defense of themselves and their own state, or the United
States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be
passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals...
The final version of the Second Amendment was a composite of
several such arms-right provisions.'t a It is noteworthy that the
ratifiers (actually U.S. Senators by that time) conformed to the gist
of the latter of the two Pennsylvania Minority provisions but
jettisoned the gist of the former (although recognizing the
"necessity of a well-regulated militia" to "the security of a free
state"). The ten amendments ratified in 1789 were said to secure
private rights, and not to alter in any manner the structure of
government that had been laid out in the 1787 Constitution. 69
164. Id.
165. See Pennsylvania Constitution, Sept. 28, 1776, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65,
at 752, 754 (providing Pennsylvanians with the right to "bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the state").
166. See Pennsylvania Minority, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at
154, 160.
167. Id.
168. Miller's holding that the right to bear arms is necessarily related to the militia
clause of the Second Amendment appears to violate the known intent of the Founders. Like
the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Second Amendment was a composite of
two or more constitutional principles. The notion that the "right of the people to keep and
bear arms" was contingent on some relationship to a "well regulated militia" is as erroneous
as the notion that the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech is contingent on
such speech having some relationship to the free exercise of religion. See ORIGIN, supra note
65, at 3-4 (recounting that the militia clause and the right to bear arms clause of the Second
Amendment originated in two separate proposals and were combined only for the purpose of
brevity and not so that the two statements would rely upon each other for operability).
169. See Letter from Rep. William L. Smith to Edward Rutledge (August 9, 1789),
reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 798 (saying "[t]here appears to be a disposition in our
house to agree to some [amendments] which will more effectually secure private rights,
2000
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James Madison, the so-called Father of the Constitution, wrote in
his personal notes that the amendments he had drafted "relate 1st
to private rights"170 and would hopefully "quiet the fears of many by
supplying those further guards for private rights."171 Madison's
statement is important because it establishes that the ratifiers did
not intend for the Second Amendment to alter in any manner the
standing army provisions or the national militia powers of
Congress.
VI. THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT THEORY'S UNWORKABILITY
Whether the collective right theory dies peacefully due to its
continuing abatement in the halls of academia, or by quick judicial
stroke in the halls of the judiciary (either in the Emerson case or
some other controversy), will be determined by how far the
theory's adherents are willing to follow their own logic. Collective
theory adherents never offer even a hypothetical enactment, either
state or federal, that would qualify for invalidation under the
Second Amendment, nor even a single hypothetical action that
might constitute an "infringement." Indeed, for all of their repetition
of the "right of the states to form militias," collective proponents
have never conceded that any federal gun control measure, either
now in existence or conceivably enacted in the near future, might
place that objective in danger.
Yet the modern, combined burden of federal gun control
legislation exacts a mighty toll on any State's ability to "regulate"
its "militia." At present, if a State governor were to call up his
State's militia for immediate action, he would contend with
immense federal interdiction obstructing his decision. His pool of
militiamen could be limited to federally approved personnel,
precluding all who have felony or domestic violence convictions,
dishonorable discharges from the United States military, drug
addiction or mental illness problems, or questionable citizenship. 7 2
The arms of his units could be limited to federally approved
firearms designed solely for non-assaultive purposes (or at least
non-assaultive appearances). 7 3 Those militiamen who must acquire
without affecting the structure of the Govt.").
170. See Dennis, supra note 86, at 70 (quoting Madison).
171. Id.
172. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994) (making unlawful the possession of "any firearm or
ammunition" that "has been... transported in interstate... commerce" by anyone who has
been convicted of a crime that warrants imprisonment for more than one year, who is a drug
addict, who suffers from officially recognized mental deficiencies, or who is an illegal alien).
173. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o), (v) (1994) (making unlawful the possession of machine
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or upgrade their personal arms would also find themselves denied
immediate purchases at gun stores, pending federally mandated
background checks and waiting periods. 74 To be sure, collective
right advocates would hardly appreciate the obvious result of a
challenge by a state attorney general on grounds that federal law is
infringing on that state's ability to "regulate" its militias. Under the
collective right theory, however, such a challenge would, by
necessary implication, require the invalidation of all infringing
federal gun statutes.17 5
Perhaps the primary reason why the collective right theory
cannot survive lies in the theory's glaring inconsistencies with the
Constitution itself. At least three provisions of Article I appear
inconsistent with the collective right interpretation of the Second
Amendment. 1 6 Article I grants Congress the power to "provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions,"1 77 and to "provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining, the Militia," 78 and requires that no state
guns and semiautomatic assault weapons). Note that such statutes contain numerous
exemptions and conditions that might impact such firearm use in the context of law
enforcement or militia duty. To the extent that such exemptions and conditions are unclear,
however, the ability of militia members to obtain proper militia arms seems highly controlled
by federal law. See §922(o) (allowing the possession of a machine gun by one who possesses
it "under the authority of the United States... a State,... or political subdivision thereof..
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (1994) (requiring licensed dealers to wait for the result of
background checks of potential buyers before selling firearms).
175. See Roger Roots, The NRA v. The Right to Bear Arms, FREE AMERICAN, Sept. 1998,
at 51, 53 (stating that most federal gun control is doomed). In 1990 when Governor Perpich
of Minnesota challenged the validity of a federal defense statute that authorized the Defense
Department to order Minnesota's National Guard units out of the country for military
training, the United States Supreme Court essentially held the "collective rights theory"
invalid although not squarely addressing the Second Amendment. See Perpich v. Dep't of
Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990). The Court held that because National Guard enlistees are
simultaneously enrolled in the national military, the federal government maintains control
over their movements, military training and actions, and no state governor can withhold
consent. Id. Perpich was based upon the militia clauses of the Constitution and did not
address any Second Amendment issue. Indeed, the Court did not even include the Second
Amendment as a "militia clause" - suggesting that the Court either negligently overlooked
the potential impact of the Second Amendment or concluded that the Amendment addresses
rights of individuals rather than military or militia concerns. Id.
176. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States'
Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L REV. 1737, 1744 (1995) (highlighting the
inconsistencies between the Constitution and the States' right theory).
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. The clause goes on to grant Congress the power to
govern "such Part of [the militia] as may be employed in the Service of the United States"
with the condition that the respective states themselves must retain power to appoint the
militia officers and hold authority for training the Militia, but "according to the discipline
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shall, "without the Consent of Congress, keep Troops, or Ships of
War in time of Peace." 79
Under a states' right or collective right interpretation of the
Second Amendment, each of these three constitutional provisions
would seem to "infringe" on a state's right to regulate its militias.
180
For that matter, the National Guard system that exists today would
be unconstitutional. 8' Because "consent of Congress" is required
for a state to keep troops or warships in peacetime, as Article I
requires, the militias' alleged check on federal tyranny seems
grossly intruded upon, if not null and void, from the beginning.
Collective right theorists occasionally argue that the modern
National Guard - composed of paid full-time and part-time troops
drawn from the respective states and answerable in part to the
state governors - constitute the militia (and therefore, "the
people") of the Second Amendment.8 2 Following this assertion
even further, collective right theorists claim that any law that does
not infringe on the power of state governments to equip National
Guard units will withstand scrutiny under the Second
Amendment.'8' Yet the notion that "the people" of the Second
Amendment are the modern National Guard seems fantastically
ill-fitting in the context of the debates of the late eighteenth
century. '84
prescribed by Congress."
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
180. One can assume that because the Bill of Rights was a later addendum to the
"preamendment Constitution," "it must thus be viewed as an implicit repeal or modification"
of those prior constitutional provisions. Kates, supra note 176, at 1744. Indeed, under a true
application of a collective right scheme, Congress would be forbidden to organize, arm or
discipline the Militia if such action "infringed" on the right of state governments to regulate
their militias. See id. (stating that "if the Second Amendment was designed to create an
independent state counterweight to federal military power, then it must at the very least
protect those aspects of state military forces that are independent and that serve as
counterweights to federal power.").
181. See id. at 1743.
182. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 56, at 126 (claiming that the Supreme Court holds
that the arms right is "a collective one that allows a state to raise a militia (today, the
national guard)").
183. See Marguerite A. Driessen, Private Organizations and the Militia Status: They
Don't Make Militias Like They Used To, 1998 BYU L REV. 1, 32(1998) (saying that the only
action likely to be found violative of the Second Amendment is, "perhaps, federal
confiscation of weapons in state militia armories - disarming the state police or the state
National Guard units."). "It is not the individual's right to keep and bear arms that the
Second Amendment protects; it is the militia's right. And it is not any militia that can claim
that right; it is the official militia." Id.
184. Professional, or regular, troops, such as National Guard units, were regarded as
the antithesis of the militia concept in the ratification era. Noah Webster, for example,
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The National Guard is, by law, a component of the national
military under the command of the commander-in-chief and subject
to the budgetary constraints provided by Congress. Today's
National Guard units do not even meet the basic constitutional
requirements for a "militia." For example, the National Guard is
hired, paid, trained, and organized by the leaders of the United
States military. It is irrefragable that the Founders would view
today's National Guard - a force consisting entirely of
professional, full-time or part-time troops - as standing army
units.
185
The collective right theory also flies in the face of fundamental
principles of the United States Constitution, the founding of the
United States, and the Bill of Rights. Unlike the Articles of
Confederation, that recognized the States as its fundamental
organizational unit, the United States Constitution does not build
upon state legislatures and does not rely upon state governments.
The Constitution was ratified by conventions of citizens rather than
by state legislatures, in large part because of the Founders' fears
that if put before state legislatures, it would have been killed. 86
Nevertheless, collective right theorists portray the Second
Amendment as little more than a specific-issue version of the Tenth
Amendment. Why then do not the same arguments which
disempower the Tenth Amendment into a mere "truism" apply to
empower the Second Amendment to preclude the federal
government from enacting gun control legislation?
187
argued that the Constitution was to embody the principle that unjust laws could not be
enforced by the sword "because the whole body of the people are armed, and constitute a
force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence, raised in the
United States." See Malcolm, supra note 16, at 157 (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION
INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787)).
185. See, e.g., Zachariah Johnson's words during the Virginia Convention, June 25, 1788,
reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65 (defending the proposed militia provisions of the
Constitution by saying "Congress has *only the power of arming and disciplining them.").
186. Chief Justice John Marshall, in his famous McCulloch v. Maryland opinion,
pointed out that the Constitution was not written for the states but for the people. 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819). It was dedicated, presented, voted on, and ratified completely
without the input of the states as parties. "It required not the affirnance, and could not be
negatived, by the state governments." Id. at 404.
187. The jurisprudence of the Tenth Amendment is odd when juxtaposed with that of
the Second Amendment. The very gun laws that collective theory adherents support result
from an extension of the commerce power that would not have been possible without a
weakening of states' rights during the course of the twentieth century. See Carlo D'Angelo,
Note, The Impact of United States v. Lopez Upon Selected Firearms Provisions, 8 ST.
THOMAS L REV. 571 (1996) (stating that many federal gun control measures violate the
Commerce Clause).
2000
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If "people" means government, the Second Amendment would
protect no one from governmental power. It would mean that the
Founding Generation fought a bloody eight-year war, gaining
through violence their independence from the most heavily armed
government in the world, only to grant their governments the right
to bear arms. It must be remembered that the placement of a Bill
of Rights into the Constitution was a herculean feat that. seems
difficult to reconcile with the notion that it secured a meaningless
nullity.188 Yet the collective right theory would essentially enshrine a
nullity, for the right of state militias to exist was implicitly
recognized even in the pre-amendment text of the Constitution.8 9
As Joyce Lee Malcolm has pointed out, it seems redundant to
specify that members of a militia had a right to be armed. 10 "A
militia could scarcely function otherwise." 19'
Yet another immense problem with the logic of the collective
theory is that it would have been laughably redundant at the time
of the country's Founding. The states at the time of the Founding
could have easily crushed the minuscule federal government. 9 2 The
very notion that any state government could ever be stripped of its
power to arm its own officers is, to this day, outrageous. 19 3
188. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 375 (1986); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 649 (1984); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397, 415 (1970); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (all standing for the general
proposition that courts should construe all constitutional and legislative enactments to have
some meaning).
189. This has been admitted even by collective theory proponents. See Ehrman, supra
note 51, at 23 (stating that "the 'right to exist' of the state militias was recognized by the
creation of a separate national army."). The Constitution's text clearly reflects that the states
had certain authority over even the militias that were to be used in federal service in war.
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 16.
190. Malcolm, supra note 16, at 163.
191. Id.
192. James Madison, who drafted the standing army provisions of the Constitution,
dismissed the Anti-Federalists' fears of a federal standing army by explaining that no federal
army could impose its will on the states when the federal army was small compared to the
vast state militia. See, Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun
Control Legislation, 58 MONTANA L. REV. 79, 88 (1997). Madison went on to say that even if
the federal army became something of a tyrant, the American people would easily defeat it
because they were permitted to have arms. See id. (stating "that the federal army was not
like the army of a European tyrant . . . because [the American people] were permitted to
have arms.") (footnote omitted).
193. The 1996 Supreme Court decision in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997),
shows that the federal government's power to regulate the affairs of state officers is
constitutionally limited regardless of any Second Amendment considerations. The Court in
Printz invalidated a congressional mandate compelling state sheriffs and police officers to
conduct background checks upon gun purchasers pursuant to a federal gun regulation. Id. at
935. Printz was decided on general federalism grounds rather than Second Amendment
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VII. INSURRECTION THEORY
Some of the most twisted rhetoric surrounding the right to bear
arms concerns the notion that the arms right is a check on one's
own government. Collective right proponents derisively refer to this
notion as "insurrectionist theory" and suggest that there is
something irrational or repulsive about it.194 They attack the
Standard Model by claiming that the right to bear arms without
government sanction constitutes "rival sovereignty" and "denies the
consent to be governed." 195 The belief of the Framers that an armed
citizenry was needed to prevent governmental tyranny seems
incomprehensible to modern "elite decision-makers" 9 6 who see
unregulated gun ownership as an anachronism and a "blot upon
civilization."
197
Collective proponents assert that democratic institutions alone
are sufficient protection against tyranny.198 Such "bulwarks against
oppression" as free speech, a free press, the right to elect leaders,
and an independent judiciary are said to provide all the protection
required, with no need ever to resort to the right to bear arms in
revolt.199 Indeed, the private right of arms possession, according to
at least one collective right proponent, threatens the "rational
policymaking in a representative democracy" such as the United
States. 20
0
grounds. See Id. (stating that the federal government may not commandeer state officials
because "such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of
dual sovereignty"). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, said the Framers "rejected the
concept of a central government... and instead designed a system in which the State and
Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people .... " Id. at
919-20.
194. See, e.g., Craco, supra note 14, at 7 (saying that "since the Constitution's objective
was to create a government, it would have been irrational to provide, in the same document,
a legal means for that government's armed destruction.").
195. See Potomac Institute, Amicus Curiae Brief at 6, 7, United States v. Emerson,
__ F3d - (5th Cir. __) (No. 99-10331). The Potomac Institute, a gun control
organization in Bethesda, Maryland, has filed amicus briefs opposing the individual right to
bear arms in a number of major gun cases. See Potomac Institute (visited May 17, 2000)
<http'//www.potomac-inc.org/emerarg.html.>
196. McAffee, supra note 2, at 799 (stating that such elites believe the right to arms is
an anachronism).
197. B. Bruce Briggs, The Great American Gun War, 45 PUB. INTEREST 61 (1976).
198. See Bogus, supra note 5, at 319 (mocking Steven Halbrook's disbelief that
constitutional mechanisms, such as the division of power between the federal and state
governments and among the three branches of the national government, a bicameral
legislature, an independent judiciary, freedom of speech and press, and a civilian
commander-in-chief, are adequate to ensure that government power will not be misused).
199. Dowd, supra note 192, at 94.
200. Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction
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This faith in the benevolence and supremacy of government was
by no means shared by the Founding Generation.201 A cursory
review of the dialogue that occurred regarding the Constitution in
the late eighteenth century reveals that the modem claim that no
right of insurrection against tyranny was contemplated by the
Framers when they adopted the Bill of Rights is a farce.202 The
Founders were themselves insurrectionists 2 3 who hardly viewed




Indeed, had it not been for the Founders' use of independent,
totally unsanctioned, and legally forbidden militias,205 bearing
forbidden private arms and engaged in actual insurrection, the
United States of America would not exist today.
2°6
The ratification debates show that as Anti-Federalist detractors
of the Constitution called for a bill of rights, Federalist supporters
of the Constitution argued that no bill of rights was needed
of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U L REV. 57, 61 (1995).
201. See, e.g., Mr. Tredwell, statements before the New York Convention, July 2, 1788,
reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 464, 467 (arguing that Federalist pleas to have faith
that political leaders will not violate the rights of citizens were alarming and that "it is
proved by all experience [that suspicious jealousy of those in power] is essentially necessary
for the preservation of freedom.").
202. Indeed, the prospective bill of rights proposed by a sizeable body at the Virginia
Convention included, in its third declaration, a statement that "the doctrine of nonresistance
against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and
happiness of mankind." Virginia Convention, June 27, 1788, Proposed Declaration of Rights,
reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 457.
203. See ORIGIN, supra note 65, at xxvii (saying that the "well regulated militia [as
described in the Bill of Rights] was clearly the very same armed populace in existence in
1776 which was in the process of resisting the encroachments of the government backed by
a standing army.").
204. It is, of course, historically inaccurate to suggest that the Founding Generation
viewed the government created by the Constitution as immune from the potential need for
popular insurrection. History, in fact, demonstrates that Americans at the time of the
Founding viewed the new government as far less legitimate than is now believed. Indeed, a
sizeable percentage of the American population was opposed to the Constitution originally.
See Patrick Henry, Debates before the Virginia Convention, June 24, 1788, reprinted in
ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 452 (stating "I believe it to be a fact that the great body of
yeomanry are in decided opposition to it.").
205. See Dowd, supra note 192, at 100 (stating that "[pirivate individuals, privately
armed, were frequently pressed into service."); see also HALBROOK, supra note 16, at 60
(noting that groups, such as the Fairfax County Militia Association, organized by George
Mason and George Washington in 1774, were not subject to the control of the royal
governor, and arose, "in part, as a defense force against the regular militia"). "The cry for
independent militias, composed of citizens who would keep their own arms, spread through
the colonies . . . ." Id. at 61.
206. See ORIGIN, supra note 65, at xxv (saying that "the people took the militia into
their own hands" and "organized, embodied, and trained themselves as a well regulated
militia without the sanction of government" prior to hostilities in the American Revolution).
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because the public would always, possess the means to overthrow
the government if it became despotic. 2 7 In response to such
reassurances, critics of the unamended Constitution objected that
they had had enough fighting in the war and would rather have
explicit guarantees in writing.208 Others threatened that armed
revolt would be on the horizon immediately after ratification so
long as no concrete guarantee of the people's individual rights
existed.21 That the Second Amendment and the other nine
amendments were intended to placate those who possessed such
sentiments - and therefore recognize the supremacy of the citizen
over government - cannot be reasonably denied.
Although critics may cite evidence that widespread arms
ownership among the citizenry may lead to instances of annoyance
for rulers, such arms ownership has done much to restrain
governments from tyrannical conduct over the course of world
207. See, for example, the words of Mr. Parsons on January 23, 1788, during the
Massachusetts Convention:
It has been objected that we have no bill of rights, If gentlemen who make this
objection would consider what are the supposed inconveniences resulting from the
want of a declaration of rights, I think they would soon satisfy themselves that the
objection has no weight ....
. . . But, sir, the people themselves have it in their power effectively to resist
usurpation.., any man may be justified in his resistance. Let him be considered as a
criminal by the general government, yet only his own fellow-citizens can convict him;
they are his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not all the powers of Congress
can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will pronounce him, if the supposed law he
resisted was an act of usurpation.
ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 229-30. See also the paraphrased words of Mr. Sedgwick on the
following day, reprinted in ORIGI, supra note 65, at 230-31 (asking "[is it possible, ....
that an army could be raised for the purpose of enslaving themselves and their brethren? Or,
if raised, whether they could subdue a nation of freemen, who know how to prize liberty,
and who have arms in their hands?").
208. The Yeomanry of Massachusetts newspaper article, BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
GAZETTE, Jan. 25, 1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 232. This article contained the
following passage:
It is argued [by the Federalists] that there is no danger that the proposed rulers will
be disposed to .. .deprive the people of their liberties. But in case, say they, they
should make such attempts, the people may, and will rise to arms and prevent it; in
answer to which, we have only to say, we have had enough of fighting in the late war,
and think it more eligible, to keep our liberties in our own hands, whilst it is in our
power thus to do ... [rather than] recovering them back by the point of the sword.
Id.
209. See Letter from Franklin County, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, April 30,
1788, reprinted in ORIGIN, supra note 65, at 339 (stating that "[tihe lawyers... when they
precipitated with such fraud and deception the new system upon us . . .did not recollect;
that the militia had arms; however, it will be an awful lesson to tyrants .... A civil war is
dreadful, but a little blood spilt now, will perhaps prevent much more hereafter.").
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history.21 0 Yet disorder is not the only potential result of wide-scale
arms ownership; millions of firearms have been used throughout
American history for hunting, sports, and personal defense.2" By
contrast, the idea of arms rights vesting solely in the state
governments presupposes that their sole purpose is to act against




The collective right theory of the Second Amendment - which
contends that the Framers set forth the Second Amendment right
to bear arms as a states-rights provision and not as protection for
an individual right - has been all but orphaned by the legal
academy. Scholarly defenders of the theory now express their
support in philosophical, conditional, and provisional - rather than
purely historical - terms. Only within the halls of the federal
courts - where the theory was born in the mid-twentieth century
- has the theory managed to survive and thrive. As the twenty-first
century begins, the theory has become increasingly difficult to
justify in court opinions. It seems virtually certain that the theory's
days as a legitimate jurisprudential doctrine are numbered.
210. See David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of
Rights, 4 J.L. & PoL 1, 8 (1987) (stating that the results of citizen armament during the reign
of Queen Elizabeth included her subjects drawing pistols in church or firing them in the
churchyards, and other annoyances, but "did much to restrain excessive royal power. An
English king had to remember that his [officers and guards] . .. were but a handful, and bills
or bows were in every farm and cottage.").
211. See JOHN R. LOTF, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN
CONTROL LAws (1998) (providing figures suggesting millions of individuals have used guns for
defense of lives and property). For a collection of selected descriptions of defensive uses of
private guns, see ROBERT A. WATERS, THE BEST DEFENSE, TRUE STORIES OF INTENDED VICTIMS
WHO DEFENDED THEMSELVES WITH A FIREARM (1998).
212. See Don B. Kates & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Second Amendment and States'
Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 Wm. & MARY L REV. 1737, 1764 (1995) (saying that the
states' right, or collective, approach seems likely - and even intended - to create
state-federal confrontations).
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